Epistemic labels distinguish textual facts, descriptions of tradition, and interpretations. They are not confidence scores.
Tradition · Draft
Aristotle defines distributive justice proportionally
Aristotle distinguishes distributive justice as proportionate equality, assigning goods to persons by geometric proportion rather than strict arithmetic equality.
Scholarly disagreement: Disagreement centers on whether his geometric proportion can be mapped onto modern anti-discrimination egalitarian frameworks or is tied to household/political status distinctions.
- Ross, W. D., Nicomachean Ethics (1925) · Draft · V.1131a–1131b
- Kraut, Aristotle's Ethics · Draft · Book V, distributive justice
Interpretation · Draft
Aristotle treats civic friendship as a social bond
Aristotle treats civic friendship as a social condition that helps sustain just community and trust between citizens.
Scholarly disagreement: Some scholarship reads friendship as primarily moral and optional, while others argue it is a constitutive political virtue for stable citizenship.
- Ross, W. D., Nicomachean Ethics (1925) · Draft · VIII.1156a–1158a
- Kraut, Aristotle's Ethics · Draft · Friendship and politics
Tradition · Draft
Aristotle calls justice a complete virtue toward others
Aristotle describes justice as a complete virtue in relation to others, because it orders one’s actions to a shared ethical good with fellow citizens.
Scholarly disagreement: Interpretive disagreement is whether Aristotle’s ‘complete virtue’ language is primarily normative or primarily legal in this context.
- Ross, W. D., Nicomachean Ethics (1925) · Draft · V.1129b
- Kraut, Aristotle's Ethics · Draft · Justice as complete virtue
Interpretation · Draft
Aristotle grounds civic obligation in character relations
In Aristotle, obligations in virtuous friendship are rooted in shared character and mutual recognition, not only reciprocal exchange or utility.
Scholarly disagreement: There is disagreement over whether Aristotle limits this to complete friendship or allows this structure to guide weaker, instrumental forms of relation.
- Ross, W. D., Nicomachean Ethics (1925) · Draft · VIII.1155a–1160a; IX.1167a
- Kraut, Aristotle's Ethics · Draft · Character and complete friendship
Interpretation · Draft
Confucian duties follow social roles
Confucian ethical duties are specified by role relations such as ruler and minister or parent and child, each with different practical obligations.
Scholarly disagreement: The major disagreement concerns the balance between role-specific duties and more universal moral obligations to strangers or outsiders.
- Legge, Analects (1893) · Draft · 1.6; 12.1; 12.11
- Cline, Confucius, Rawls, and the Sense of Justice · Draft · Role and reciprocity analysis
- Yu, Ethics of Confucius and Aristotle · Draft · Confucian duty structure
Interpretation · Draft
Confucian obligations are cultivated in practice
Confucian sources present ethical obligation as shaped by disciplined practice (xiao and li), not as compliance with detached abstract legal-style rules.
Scholarly disagreement: Some interpreters view this as anti-formalism, while others argue Confucianism also includes explicit formal requirements that are more rule-like than this claim suggests.
- Legge, Analects (1893) · Draft · 1.2; 2.3; 12.1
- Cline, Confucius, Rawls, and the Sense of Justice · Draft · Cultivation and normativity
- Yu, Ethics of Confucius and Aristotle · Draft · Ritual and moral formation
Interpretation · Draft
Confucian obligation is mutually responsive
Confucian sources frame obligation as reciprocal response within relationships, not only unilateral benevolence toward others.
Scholarly disagreement: Some modern interpreters read Confucian reciprocity as primarily hierarchical rather than mutual, while others find it structurally responsive across role asymmetries.
- Legge, Analects (1893) · Draft · 2.3; 15.24; 12.22
- Cline, Confucius, Rawls, and the Sense of Justice · Draft · Reciprocity and social duty
- Yu, Ethics of Confucius and Aristotle · Draft · Comparative section on reciprocity
Tradition · Draft
Ren extends humane concern outward
Confucian teaching describes ren as a humane disposition cultivated as concern extends from kin through broader social ties.
Scholarly disagreement: There is debate over whether this extension is meant as universal equality or concentric partiality ordered by social role.
- Legge, Analects (1893) · Draft · 15.24; 12.22
- Cline, Confucius, Rawls, and the Sense of Justice · Draft · Ren and social scope
- Yu, Ethics of Confucius and Aristotle · Draft · Ren in civic relations
Tradition · Draft
Kant defines autonomy as self-legislation
Kant defines autonomy as the will’s capacity to legislate the moral law for itself through practical reason.
Scholarly disagreement: Some interpreters read Kant’s self-legislation as individual sovereignty, while others stress its communal validity through shared rational agency.
- Abbott, Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals · Draft · III:4:440–4:441
- Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends · Draft · Autonomy as legislation
- O'Neill, Acting on Principle · Draft · Moral agency section
Tradition · Draft
Kant ties moral worth to duty
Kant says an action has moral worth when done from duty rather than mere inclination, even when it produces agreeable outcomes.
Scholarly disagreement: The extent of this distinction is debated: some readings treat inclination as never irrelevant to moral worth, while others preserve a stricter Kantian exclusivity.
- Abbott, Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals · Draft · I:4:397–4:398
- Johnson & Cureton, Kant's Moral Philosophy · Draft · Section on motive and duty
- Wood, Kantian Ethics · Draft · Sections 1–2
Tradition · Draft
Kant on good will as unqualified good
In the *Groundwork*, Kant identifies a good will as good without qualification, so its worth does not depend on outcomes.
Scholarly disagreement: Most interpreters accept this as Kant’s axiom, while some argue the claim depends on accepting Kant’s theory of moral worth over alternatives that prioritize outcomes or character as primary value.
- Abbott, Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals · Draft · I:4:393
- Johnson & Cureton, Kant's Moral Philosophy · Draft · Chapter 3
- Wood, Kantian Ethics · Draft · Moral worth and the good will
Tradition · Draft
Kant forbids treating persons merely as means
Kant’s humanity formula requires that one never treat rational persons merely as means for one’s purposes.
Scholarly disagreement: The interpretive dispute is mainly over whether this rule is absolute for all social action or only binding in direct coercion and deception cases.
- Abbott, Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals · Draft · II:4:429
- Wood, Kantian Ethics · Draft · Formula of humanity
- Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends · Draft · Ch. 2
Interpretation · Draft
Kant frames moral community as a kingdom of ends
In the *Groundwork*, Kant presents the kingdom of ends as a systematic community in which rational agents are both authors and subjects of common moral law.
Scholarly disagreement: The claim is disputed between readings that see the kingdom of ends as a regulative ideal and those treating it as a near-transcendental social ontology.
- Abbott, Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals · Draft · II:4:433–4:434
- Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends · Draft · Ch. 6
- Wood, Kantian Ethics · Draft · Community and agency
Tradition · Draft
Kant derives obligation from universalizable maxims
For Kant, one has obligation to act only on a maxim that can be consistently willed as universal law without contradiction.
Scholarly disagreement: Scholars disagree over whether universalizability alone is decisive or whether Kant also requires further moral principles to rule out formally valid but substantively problematic maxims.
- Abbott, Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals · Draft · II:4:421
- Wood, Kantian Ethics · Draft · Formula 2 analysis
- O'Neill, Acting on Principle · Draft · Acting principle interpretation
Tradition · Draft
Mill defines happiness as the moral standard
In *Utilitarianism*, Mill states that happiness—pleasure and the absence of pain—is the ultimate standard of right and wrong.
Scholarly disagreement: Debate focuses on whether Mill means purely psychological happiness or a broader evaluative notion shaped by social and moral capacities.
- Mill, Utilitarianism (1863) · Draft · Ch. 2
- Donner and Fumerton, Mill · Draft · Interpretive chapter on utility
- Crisp, Mill on Utilitarianism · Draft · Core principle section
Tradition · Draft
Mill requires impartial consideration in utility
Mill’s principle requires impartial consideration of persons: each individual’s happiness counts as one in calculating moral rightness.
Scholarly disagreement: Some contemporary critics argue that Mill’s practical writings allow procedural qualifications, especially where fairness, rights, or legal institutions alter strict numerical aggregation.
- Mill, Utilitarianism (1863) · Draft · Ch. 5
- Donner and Fumerton, Mill · Draft · Impartiality discussion
- Driver, The History of Utilitarianism · Draft · Equality and aggregation
Interpretation · Draft
Mill derives rights and justice from utility
Mill treats justice and rights as utility-based principles: they are socially required because violating them produces greater and more stable harms than their observance.
Scholarly disagreement: Some readers argue Mill’s account makes rights derivative and revisable, while others hold that justice constrains utility in a stronger sense than Mill’s own language sometimes allows.
- Mill, Utilitarianism (1863) · Draft · Ch. 4–5
- Mill, On Liberty (1859) · Draft · Ch. 5
- Driver, The History of Utilitarianism · Draft · Rights chapter
- Crisp, Mill on Utilitarianism · Draft · Mill on rights
Tradition · Draft
Mill’s Harm Principle limits justified coercion
Mill’s harm principle allows social or legal coercion only to prevent harm to others, not merely to prevent self-regarding damage.
Scholarly disagreement: Later readers debate how broadly to interpret ‘harm,’ especially for indirect social harms, paternalism, and collective risk contexts.
- Mill, On Liberty (1859) · Draft · Ch. 1
- Donner and Fumerton, Mill · Draft · Harm principle interpretation
- Crisp, Mill on Utilitarianism · Draft · Section on self-regarding acts
Tradition · Draft
Mill distinguishes higher and lower pleasures
Mill distinguishes higher and lower pleasures in moral reasoning, assigning higher value to intellectual and moral pleasures when competent judges prefer them.
Scholarly disagreement: A major criticism is that the competence of judges can itself embed classed and cultural assumptions, a point modern scholarship treats as a genuine tension in Mill’s account.
- Mill, Utilitarianism (1863) · Draft · Ch. 2
- Driver, The History of Utilitarianism · Draft · Chapter on Mill’s refinements
- Crisp, Mill on Utilitarianism · Draft · Qualitative utilitarianism
Interpretation · Draft
Mill links rightness to utility rather than motive
Mill states that an action is right insofar as it tends to promote happiness, and wrong insofar as it tends to the opposite, with motive treated as distinct from this core criterion.
Scholarly disagreement: The interpretive issue is whether Mill’s separation of rightness and motive is complete, or whether motive remains morally relevant through secondary rules and justice constraints.
- Mill, Utilitarianism (1863) · Draft · Ch. 2; Ch. 5
- Donner and Fumerton, Mill · Draft · Consequentialist reading
- Crisp, Mill on Utilitarianism · Draft · Rightness and motive